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In this article, it is shown that in some theories defending the non-reductive nature of the first-
person perspective it is possible to find a very inconsistent attitude. Such theories are associ-
ated by the author to a so-called moderate naturalism. The article demonstrates the difference 
between moderate and radical naturalism. Radical naturalism completely abandons the idea 
of subjectivity as unobservable from a third-person perspective. On the contrary, moderate 
naturalism defends the irreducibility of subjectivity, but believes subjectivity to be a part of the 
nature. As a case of moderate naturalism, the article considers the approaches of Lynne Baker 
and Thomas Metzinger. Exemplifying these approaches to the first-person perspective, it is 
shown that in the case of certain work strategies focused on the first-person perspective, it is 
possible that a so-called description error may appear, by which a description error of subjec-
tivity — when it is placed in the world as a part of nature, existing according to its laws — is 
understood. The logic of this error points to one of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s statements about 
the incorrect placement of the eye in the perspective of the eye view itself. If the first-person 
perspective is introduced as a point of view (or a point of observation), then its subsequent 
shift to the observation result area leads to description error. If there is no observation, as well 
as no viewpoint, we lose the very idea of first-person perspective and actually take the position 
of radical naturalism.
Keywords: first-person perspective, subjectivity, Lynne Baker, Thomas Metzinger, Ludwig 
Wittgenstein, naturalism, moderate naturalism, radical naturalism.
Introduction
The problems of a scientific explanation for the whole complex of subject-related ideas 
are well-known. Qualitative facts cannot be identified as physical facts, but only physical 
facts are observable and measurable. At the same time, some philosophers of conscious-
ness believe that there are no special problems in the synthesis of the idea of subjectivity 
with naturalism. Such a position is held by Ned Block, according to whom “phenomenal 
consciousness is not a secret for science” [1, p. 230]. David Chalmers also noted this at the 
beginning of his philosophical journey: “Consciousness does not imply deep metaphysical 
riddles” [2, p. 24]. Interestingly, this position, at least in the case of Chalmers, does not im-
* The results of the project “Artificial Intelligence and ‘Homo Sapiens’ as an Object of Philosophico-
Ethical Analysis”, carried out within the framework of the Basic Research Program at the National Research 
University Higher School of Economics (HSE University) in 2021, are presented in this work.
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ply any reductionism in relation to consciousness, but rather the opposite: consciousness 
should be recognized as something real, while reductionism unnecessarily simplifies the 
picture of the world. The point is, however, to preserve scientific thinking without denying 
the existence of consciousness. Thus, despite the fact that modern anti-reductionism has 
gained a foothold in the analytical philosophy of consciousness, the idea of the compa- 
tibility between science and the reality of consciousness is still rarely questioned.
However, a number of thinkers, in particular Lynne Baker and Thomas Metzinger, 
tend to believe that the problem of the first-person perspective poses a serious challenge 
to scientific naturalism [3–5]. In this case, however, we are referring to radical (or “hard”, 
as the authors themselves write) naturalism. Such naturalism is aimed at a comprehen-
sive reduction, namely, an explanation of the diversity of phenomena in terms of natural 
sciences. Baker and Metzinger themselves do not accept such naturalism, considering it 
insufficient for the phenomenon of subjectivity explanation. Both of these authors have 
invested a great deal of effort in preserving and defending the idea of subjectivity. They are 
not alone in this tradition. It has been discussed the last 30 years in the works of various 
authors [6–9]. Despite the criticism of reductionism, first-person approach has very good 
positions and even an extended application [10]. Recently, the problem of self-conscious-
ness has accompanied most of the research on consciousness in general [11].
At the same time, as I will try to show, Baker and Metzinger themselves are not ready 
to abandon naturalism completely when analyzing subjectivity and adhere to the position, 
which I will call moderate naturalism, for the sake of convenience. According to the ap-
proach that is close to them, the first-person perspective is something irreducible and real, 
but at the same time it is part of the natural world. Even if qualitative and phenomenal 
states are unobservable from the third-person perspective, there are no grounds for them 
to fall into unjustified mysticism and consider them to be manifestations of “immortal 
souls” [3]. But this also does not make it impossible to place these properties of subjecti- 
vity (I-properties) into a single evolutionary development system of all living organisms, 
and to suppose subjectivity as a graduated property of all living things. A full-fledged 
transition to the phenomenological rails and the rejection of the naturalistic approach in 
attempts to preserve the self still remains a problem [12]. The confirmation of this can be 
found in many sources [13–15].
Baker’s and (partly) Metzinger’s position on the first-person perspective can be used 
as an example, according to which subjectivity is declared to be irreducible to physical 
facts but is later placed in the field of natural facts, as a product of evolution and a pro- 
perty of living bodies. Despite the large number of authors whose theories we could use to 
illustrate the idea of a real essay, I decided to focus mainly on the two well-known names 
as a working manifestation of my thoughts. Their approaches, in my opinion, seem to be 
illustrations of moderate naturalism even though, of course, their theories do not limit the 
approach of moderate naturalism. In the same vein, it was possible to consider in detail 
the works of David Chalmers, Ned Block, Barry Smith, Evan Thompson, Shaun Gallagher 
and others [1; 16–19]. Using only two chosen curious examples of moderate naturalistic 
theories, I would like to show where they can hide possible epistemological and logical 
problems. In particular, through the famous Wittgenstein discourse on the “metaphysi-
cal subject”, which cannot be placed in the world of facts and explained by them, I will 
try to show the complexity of the natural interpretation of a first-person perspective [20]. 
Relying on his philosophical logic, I will pay attention to the fact that the subjectivity that 
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follows from the order of natural phenomena becomes a very contradictory construction. 
It will be shown that in some strategies for the preservation of the subject under moderate 
naturalism, the same mistake is often made, which was pointed out by Wittgenstein, when 
justifying the impossibility of describing the subject as a part of the world observed.
Naturalism: radical and moderate
First, it is necessary to make a distinction between moderate naturalism and radical 
naturalism. 
Radical naturalism is true if and only if reality is completely devoid of the first-person 
perspective. This means that reality can be described entirely without using any terms 
referring to the first-person. If radical naturalism insists on a total absence of the first-
person perspective, then how does it do so? The key arguments of radical naturalism are 
that what is real is either directly observable or indirectly measurable. In addition, what 
can be given as an object is also real. These three characteristics if combined allow us to 
create a capacious definition of what is real for a radical naturalist. That is the third-person 
perspective: what may be observed by different observers and in respect to which there 
can be an agreement. For example, two observers may agree on what they see is the moon 
if they point to the same “same” object in the sky1. If different observers agree on the ob-
servation, then the observed is a real object, and the observation itself is made from the 
third-person perspective.
Within the framework of radical naturalism, only what is observed from the third-
person perspective exists. This position is criticized for the fact that there is also an indi-
vidual experience of the mental state (qualia), which cannot be observed externally by dif-
ferent observers. For example, if someone smells citrus, then his or her experience itself, 
i. e., how he or she feels, cannot become the experience of another observer. It is possible 
to study in detail in what condition the human brain is when it experiences the smell of 
citrus, but his inner experience, accompanying this condition is not identical to the brain 
states. 
The logical argument in favor of the impossibility of addressing private qualitative 
states directly is the following: if we assume that the condition of a certain recipient expe-
riencing something particular becomes available to the researcher not in the form of brain 
neural activity data, but in the form of his or her own experience, it will be necessary to 
admit that this condition has become a private one for the researcher himself, rather than 
an object open for a comprehensive observation. According to this position, the pheno- 
mena of consciousness, such as pain or pleasure, has a “subjective way of being” and “ex-
ists only as experienced by the conscious subject” [21, p. 94]. Environmental entities such 
as stars and trees have an “objective way of being” [22, p. 92]: their presence in the world 
is presumed to be independent of the presence or absence of any observer endowed with 
an inner conscious life. Thus, privacy by its very nature cannot be turned into an object, 
which makes it possible to introduce the so-called unrealizable first-person perspective, 
the presence of which is reason to challenge the appropriateness of radical naturalism.
In turn, the recognition of the reality of the first-person perspective makes it possible 
either to choose a philosophical strategy alternative to naturalism, or to take the position 
1 The way in which it may well not be one and the same for different observers is a separate philosophical 
difficulty.
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of so-called moderate naturalism. By moderate naturalism, I understand such naturalism, 
which believes that the first-person perspective is an irreducible property and is absolutely 
real, but at the same time, it is itself a part of the natural world and is described in terms of 
biological explanations — evolution, graded presence of different living beings depending 
on the complexity of their organisms, etc. It is in such naturalism that, in my opinion, 
the preservation of subjectivity and its placement in the world will be accompanied by a 
description error.
Subjectivity and the first-person perspective
The idea of “ontological significance of subjectivity” [3] is one of the initial steps to-
wards the formation of an error in the subject’s description within the framework of mode- 
rate naturalism. 
According to this idea, ontological subjectivity refers to subjective phenomena that 
are ontologically significant. Ontological significance suggests that phenomena should be 
in ontology “in the full list of what exists” [3, p. 340]. To include a subject in the list of what 
exists in fact means that the subject is included in the list of objects, because we think of 
“the list of what exists” as a list of objects. Consequently, consciousness is somehow objec-
tified, bringing us back to the starting point, from which we wanted to discard. The subjec-
tive dimension cannot be an object, as it presupposes a comprehensive observation, i. e., 
a third-person perspective, which is impossible. How is this contradiction eliminated? 
First of all, consciousness is declared to be “not an essence”. This solution was offered 
by Baker, arguing that the first-person perspective is not an essence, but a property — a 
“dispositional property” with numerous manifestations. In other words, it is something po-
tential and always existing like some manifestations. It cannot be found ready-made as an 
object among other objects. According to Baker, the first-person perspective has two le- 
vels: a rudimentary one and a robust one. Both are abilities or capacities. The rudimentary 
stage that connects us to the animal world is the ability to be conscious and intentional; 
the robust stage, that is unique to us, is the ability to conceive of ourselves as ourselves. 
A first-person rudimentary perspective connects animals that are human beings with 
other animals. All animals, as well as humans, have some personal point of view from 
which they perceive and act in the world. A human baby is a human animal: it is born 
with minimal consciousness and folded intentionality. A human being, as a consciously 
and intentionally oriented being, emerges when a human body develops to the point of 
being able to support a rudimentary perspective, unlike other nonhuman organisms. Ac-
cording to Baker, the rudimentary first-person perspective does not depend on language 
or conceptual abilities. She claims that this perspective is found in many species, perhaps 
all mammals, and seems to be subject to gradation. Consciousness and intentionality de-
velop, but at what level does this formation begin? One can only wonder. Baker herself 
writes that since the formation process is a step-by-step evolutionary one, it moves from 
simpler organisms to more and more complex ones, yet the beginning of this evolutionary 
ladder can be identified only arbitrarily [3]. As we move up this evolutionary ladder, the 
rudimentary first-person perspective becomes more detailed and branched out, running 
through different animal species.
The same idea of consistent distribution of the first-person perspective in the animal 
world is supported by an evolutionary Darwinian explanation. In particular, following 
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that Darwinism believed in the existence of a single global system of coherence among all 
forms of life, the same principle will apply to the first-person perspective distribution. In 
terms of a biological basis, there is no qualitative gap between, for instance, chimpanzees 
and humans. Accordingly, as Baker states, there are no rigid qualitative transitions in the 
first person’s perspective either. The first-person perspective as a quality is only quantita-
tively distributed in nature. Human babies, as well as dogs, cows, horses and other non-
language-using mammals also have rudimentary first-person perspectives. Evolutionism 
recognizes the continuity between human animals and higher animals. Thus, the biologi-
cal continuity of the animal world is not interrupted.
At the same time, Baker notes that we have to admit that there is no identity between 
humans and animals. This in turn is due to the fact that although there is no discontinuity 
in the animal world, the evolution of human beings still leads to an ontological disconti-
nuity. The ontological gap between humans and animals is that a human baby has a remote 
capacity to form a developed first-person perspective. By remote perspective, Baker im-
plies the so-called second-order capacity, or in other words, a capacity to develop a capacity. 
For example, a human child has a remote capacity for playing the violin2. It is a question 
of potential capacities to master this or that skill, i. e., to actually receive some mental ex-
perience. Currently, the child does not have a skill to play the violin, but he or she has an 
innate capacity to form it. When a young child learns to play the violin, he or she has the 
in-hand capacity to make music. However, perhaps the child may never learn to play the 
violin, so the remote capacity will never issue an in-hand one.
Since the first-person perspective also has remote and in-hand perspectives, the re-
mote capacity to develop a first-person perspective may also not actually develop an in-
hand one and remain only in its potential form. Baker provides an example of a severe case 
of autism, in which one can talk about a similar situation. 
Baker needs these arguments for justification: since subjectivity or a first-person per-
spective is of a dispositive nature, the difficulty of declaring this perspective as an ob-
ject once it is placed in the natural world, as presented above, should be eliminated. If 
subjectivity is not given as something ready, but something we are prone to, it can no 
longer be considered an object. However, this provision does not completely resolve the 
questions. Even if we describe first-person perspectives not in terms of complete entities, 
but in terms of a certain potentiality, the very logic of describing these potentials is taken 
from the world of objects — in this case from the natural world. In fact, the first-person 
perspective is described as any other biological process, which also has the character of 
transition from a potential state to an actual one (from the remote to the current one). 
Thus, the first-person perspective is equated with any other natural phenomenon. But the 
2 According to Baker, the uniqueness of people depends on a developed first-person perspective — 
that is, “to be able to think of oneself without the use of any name, description, or demonstrative; it is 
the ability to conceive of oneself as oneself, from the inside, as it were” [3]. Baker’s hypothesis is that this 
perspective has evolved with the language. Perhaps that’s why her examples are mostly concerned with 
linguistic constructions, such as the first-person proposals like “I understand”, “I know”, “I feel”. The presence 
of such constructions can be seen as proof of the first-person perspective’s existence. The presence of the 
very ability of consciousness not to process “in the dark” [2] firstly, characterizes the perspective’s presence, 
and, secondly, is reflected in linguistic forms as a rule: any creature that is able to think this way possesses 
a developed first-person perspective. However, from the point of view of traditional phenomenology, this 
position can be challenged, since the I-experience does not have to fit into conscious linguistic forms, but it 
has to be present, as a transcendental synthesis, for example, which may precede the language form as well. 
At the very least, this question can be characterized as a phenomenologically debatable one.
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fact that we can apply the metaphor of transition from the remote to the in-hand state says 
nothing about the essence of the perspective itself, which remains problematic as it still 
retains uncertainty for the natural sciences.
Baker has other arguments in favor of linking the first-person perspective to natural 
science data. In particular, she argues that the first-person perspective is connected to 
empirical verification, as some characteristics that we attribute to the self are derived from 
experience. For example, my self-identification as a human being, as a woman, as a speak-
er of a certain language — all this is taken from experience. Cartesian attitudes regarding 
self-authentication of the self and its transcendental origin are not shared by Baker. In 
particular, one of her arguments is that the linguistic ability, actually constitutive for the 
instance of the self, is formed within the limits of experience. To clarify this opposing view, 
it would be worthwhile to draw on Kant’s famous thesis that “as far as time is concerned, 
then, no cognition in us precedes experience, and with experience every cognition begins” 
[23, B1]. Of course, no competence, linguistic or any other kind, is formed in isolation 
from experience and, unlike the naive excesses of Cartesian-type rationalism, it points to 
the necessity of experience in order to “launch” structures out of experience. The obvious 
connection between our skills and experience in no way disproves the existence of pre-
experimental structures that form this experience.
Concluding, we can note that in Baker’s approach, the first indication of the subject’s 
erroneous description can be seen — it not only belongs to the natural world, but also 
gains empirical properties. 
Let us now turn to Metzinger’s reasoning and see how he demonstrates that subjec-
tivity can be represented in the world while not being reduced. It should be noted that 
Metzinger appears to be more cautious when addressing the idea of representation of con-
sciousness in the world. To eliminate possible misunderstandings, he divides conscious 
experience into two levels — one of experience and the other of realizing it. The first one is 
available to empirical observation procedures, while the second one is not. He beings with 
a “transparent phenomenal self-model”, which can belong to an animal or any other pre-
linguistic being. Metzinger also uses the idea of a certain transition from potential quali-
ties to actual ones. As a result, he says that “A conscious cognitive subject is generated as 
soon as a globally available representation of the system currently generating or operating 
on quasi-linguistic, opaque mental representations is integrated into the already existing 
transparent self-model” [4, p. 395]. 
Essentially, the first appearance of the self is a part of the opaque self-model, inte-
grated into the previous transparent self-model. For example, this state is in accordance 
with my experience of a desire to sleep. The second appearance of the self is my awareness 
of this experience and it is phenomenologically transparent, while the first appearance of 
the self is opaque. This means that I do not notice my awareness of my desire to sleep while 
I notice my desire to sleep. What remains mostly invisible to me is the actual experience 
of awareness. In Metzinger’s case, it seems that the transparent part does not fit into the 
world, while the opaque part (the very desire to sleep) does. It is that my desire to sleep 
can be found in the form of some kind of neurophysiological experience (i. e., in the form 
of a neural state in the brain), but my awareness of this experience cannot be recognized 
on any device. Therefore, in some sense, it does not “fit into the world”. Thus, as Metzinger 
writes: “It seems that we are subjects of experience in the world. But the experience of be-
ing a subject of experience remains phenomenal” [4, p. 395]. In fact, this formulation is 
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close to what I am willing to say in this article: Metzinger’s description is more in line with 
the way the experience of subjectivity should be treated, namely not to try to describe it 
in terms of empirical data. 
Let us take a look at the difficulties of placing subjectivity in the world according to 
the rights of the phenomenon of nature.
An error of describing the subject as located in the world. 
Asymmetry of the observable and the unobservable
By an error of description, I mean such a type of description when the formation 
condition of some observation is described in the same language in which the content of 
observation is described. It is a matter of mixing languages and ultimately using an irrel-
evant language. Below, I explain what is understood here and how this error relates to the 
above-mentioned moderate naturalism theories. 
It is easily seen that in their view of the first-person perspective, Baker and Metzinger 
are trying to combine the traditional naturalism of scientific origin (primarily in the form 
of Darwin’s theory of evolution) with a philosophical understanding of the inner experi-
ence of consciousness irreducibility — the so-called first-person perspective. In general, 
synthetic theories like these two have some naturalistic and non-naturalistic aspects. By 
their own admission, they are naturalistic because they “do not appeal to intangible souls” 
[3, p. 329]. However, in my opinion, it is more than that. Such a definition of involve-
ment in naturalism presupposes a kind of new European view of possible dispositions of 
naturalism and non-naturalism preceding phenomenology and transcendentalism. In my 
opinion, these theories are naturalistic because the origin of the subject is thought of as 
a part and a product of nature. According to them, the first-person perspective emerged 
through the natural selection process, and humanity itself, with its inherent first-person 
perspective, is as much a part of the natural world as all other animals. Despite the fact 
that in one of her latest works Baker speaks more clearly about the need for a phenom-
enological approach to the analysis of the problem of first-person perspective, I will show 
below the extent to which her approach still retains a naturalistic subtext. As Baker writes: 
“The first-person perspective may well have evolved through natural selection; we human 
persons, with our first-person perspectives, are as much a part of the natural world as the 
dinosaurs. I have no doubt that something is happening in my brain that allows me to have 
I*thoughts and I have no doubt that our capacity to have I*thoughts is a product of natural 
selection” [3, p. 339]. 
As it follows from such formulations, the first-person perspective existence is suc-
cessfully described in terms and concepts that are relevant to the objects of formalization 
from the third-person perspective. Natural objects are described by the language of evolu-
tion, natural selection, development of biological organisms, etc. However, all these de-
scriptions may not be applicable to the first-person perspective, unless it is really thought 
as something that is not identical to physical phenomena in the natural world. The simple 
idea that the very language of nature’s description in scientific terms is itself already the 
result of first-person perspective work, in respect of which it is logically incorrect to take 
the external position of observation, seems to escape the attention of such theories. It is 
this systematic and seemingly conscious omission that can be considered a sign of authen-
tic naturalism. 
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What is wrong with this approach?
Theories protecting the first-person perspective, such as both Metzinger and Baker, 
seem to begin with a somewhat sensible intuition that the subjective dimension is not 
reducible to anything physical. However, after this setting, they increasingly shift towards 
the naturalization of the description, reasoning about consciousness “from the outside”. In 
particular, it is asserted that animals possess consciousness, it is graded, and it develops 
in the course of evolution, etc. In Wittgenstein’s terminology, the language of facts is used 
where it should be meaningless [24]. Most of these statements have no meaning and serve 
only as a convenient metaphor for some description of consciousness, as long as we need 
to do it one way or another. But the introduction of consciousness into the world as a part 
of this world is more like a logical mistake. One of the inherent principles of the first-per-
son perspective is that the description of the world is made from within this perspective, 
and therefore the subsequent placement of the source of interpretation in the interpretable 
suffers from some inconsistency.
The first and key argument against such inclusion is that it is impossible to describe 
what is claimed to be non-physical through the characteristics of the physical. If we re- 
cognize that consciousness is irreducible to the physical, then its subsequent description 
as a product of evolution, as a phenomenon generated by the brain or as a quality inherent 
in other animals (this can neither be claimed nor denied), is the result of an unjustified 
application of language taken from the description of other objects. Strictly speaking, we 
cannot in any way speculate on the nature of consciousness, or on the causes or condi-
tions of its occurrence. The problem of such descriptions is that in their formation we 
are forced to turn to the language of empirical objects and phenomena, since we have no 
other concepts and terms at hand. However, as soon as consciousness has been declared 
a non-empirical object, the applicability of the empirical language of description to it has 
no sufficient grounds. The application of the empirical language in this case is no more 
justified than the application of any other metaphysical language, including the spiritualist 
language that asserts the existence of souls.
The second argument is that if we assume, following Metzinger, that there is a trans-
parent consciousness that can be considered a conditio sine qua non of opaque experience, 
then the transparent, phenomenal consciousness cannot be included in the field of opaque 
experiences. This phenomenal state will be a condition of the possibility of experience, but 
in itself it will not be another experience. Equally, it cannot be described as an experience 
and have the same language applied to it that is applied to experiences.
This principle can be formulated in another way: what is given to us as a result or a 
consequence of certain conditions of realization cannot include these conditions as a part 
of data. They cannot be given inside what is given with their help. The experience of con-
sciousness by means of which a certain reality is given is not a part of this reality.
If we now apply this principle even more broadly, namely to the first-person perspec-
tive itself, we can say that the first-person experience is an observation condition and does 
not fall within the range of this observation. It seems that we should keep in mind some 
epistemic asymmetry of the observable and the unobservable — the first-person perspec-
tive cannot be a part of the observed world. Using a metaphor, we may say that the obser-
vation forming the picture is not its depicted part. 
That is why we do not find subjectivity in the world, nor do we find it among empiri-
cal objects. With the help of a subjective perspective, we find the world and all objects in 
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it, but we do not find this perspective as an object. If we talk about the subject itself in the 
natural world, it is more likely to be a kind of break or blind spot (we see the neural pro-
cess as a sequential chain of physical events, but qualia is not a part of this process). The 
first-person perspective (the subject) is represented in the world not only in terms of “the 
explanatory gap” [25], but also in ontological terms (as a gap in the middle of the objects 
of observation).
Thus, if we agree that subjective experience will systematically slip away from de-
scriptions seeking to form a homogeneous field of observation, we risk not being able to 
create even a moderately naturalistic theory of consciousness.
These considerations do not seem to be taken into account in theories, such as the 
ones we have considered. The position of both approaches is more like an attempt to de-
clare consciousness as another fundamental law of nature. The key to this position is that 
nature, as something manifested and consisting of objects and relations between them, 
can and should contain another object, unique and surprising, the object-consciousness. 
In doing so, both of the approaches considered attempt to preserve a special autonomy of 
consciousness, which is irreducible to physics. But this very autonomy, according to said 
approaches, should be placed in the world — the only and final world of nature.
This is exactly the approach we consider as an example of a description error. This 
position is similar to Wittgenstein’s famous thesis about the nonpresence of the subject of 
observation in the observed world: “5.633. Where in the world is a metaphysical subject to 
be noted? You say that this case is altogether like that of the eye and the field of sight. But 
you do not really see the eye. And from nothing in the field of sight can it be concluded 
that it is seen from an eye” [24, p. 75].
The most important thing in this statement is the problematic application of the same 
descriptive language to the first-person perspective, which we use to describe the objects 
of nature, namely, evolution, brain-generated, graduality, inherent in living beings, etc. 
One cannot take an observation position and expect to find it in the observation field 
concurrently. At the same time, the unobserved makes itself possible to observe, but it 
must remain structurally unobservable — any attempt to make it observable (objectiv-
ized) leads to metalanguage paradoxes. The non-observability arises because this place is 
occupied by the observer and cannot be “transferred” to the picture. 
In fact, this very moment of non-observability can be interpreted as an actual pres-
ence of the observer — the subject of observation, since the subject-observer can be found 
when the picture of the description is incomplete. In this case, we can really witness the 
I-perspective presence (however always indirectly, namely by the traces of its nonpresence 
in the picture). The self-perspective is a perspective from which one looks, but which one 
cannot see. This is the most essential definition of the self-perspective. The subjectivity of 
the self-perspective lies not only in the privacy and qualitativeness of its states, but also 
in its very location. It is not important for the observer whether the content of his or her 
perception is physical or non-physical, but how the observer himself or herself is located 
in relation to this perception. Equally insignificant is its physical embodiment because 
even if it is executed, it will not be a part of the observation. To be a subject means not to 
be placed in the observable.
However, according to the approaches considered, the subject should become a part 
of the natural world, i. e., become homogeneous to everything observed. The service pro-
vided to the subject by projects such as these comes down to the idea of preserving the 
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subject in the world. The subject cannot be expelled from it, nor can it be declared a ghost 
or fiction. However, if the subject does not fit into the natural world, this does not mean 
that it is declared a ghost. Wittgenstein’s thesis used above means refraining from any 
affirmative judgments or descriptions of the subject. The subject is not inside the world, 
but on its border — it is a condition of the possibility of the world, not its ingredient. 
Therefore, in fact, the first-person perspective should be transcendental, not belonging 
to the world of things, nature and any other naturalized objects. This is why we do not 
find a first-person perspective in the world, among objects. Through this perspective, or 
“self-consciousness”, we find the world and all objects in it, but we do not find the “self-
consciousness” as an object; what allows us to grasp, cannot be grasped itself.
Nevertheless, the idea that “we human persons, with our first-person perspectives, 
are as much a part of the observable world” [3, p. 338] seems to be “kneaded” with the 
description error. The world, as a certain way of conceptualization, appears by virtue of 
our consciousness. To search for the consciousness itself inside the world means to make 
a trivial logical mistake of substituting the cause with the consequence. The theories dis-
cussed above affirm the reality of the first-person perspective, but paradoxically, they do 
not say anything about who has the perspective, since he, who has it, is not a part of the 
observed world. 
In conclusion, let us pose the following question. Does identifying the error of in-
cluding the subject in the world mean implicit acceptance of idealism? What is the philo-
sophical alternative to this mistake? At the beginning of this article, we stated that Baker 
explicitly claims to be unready to accept the existence of immaterial substances — souls. 
If we assert that subjects are not part of the world, does this mean that we automatically 
accept the substantial existence of souls? Of course, this is not the case. From the classical 
stance of philosophy, we know that a more mature alternative to naturalism is not idealism 
in its metaphysical execution, but transcendentalism according to which notions such as 
the subject should be placed neither inside nor outside the world. In fact, any statements 
about constructs that participate in the organization of these statements are logically in-
correct. Therefore, the alternative to this position is transcendentalism, a kind of which 
(apart from the classical Kantian one) we adhere to for the approach used in this article, 
namely the Wittgensteinian approach.
Conclusion
The article has attempted to show that moderate naturalism theories, such as Baker’s 
and Metzinger’s, occupy a rather complicated position and they are not devoid of contro-
versies. On the one hand, the theories argue that science (at least as it is today) cannot be 
the final word about the existent. This kind of naturalism protects the first-person perspec-
tive, as a real one. On the other hand, the philosophers of this direction, while rejecting 
naturalism as an all-encompassing commitment to the methods of natural sciences, try to 
retain naturalistic theories to justify the presence of subjectivity in the world. In pursuing 
this goal, they seek to describe subjectivity as something that, despite its extraempirical 
character, lives by the laws of empiricism. Subjectivity may be a part of evolution, belong 
to different living beings, and be graduated depending on the complexity of the organism. 
It can be preserved at the level of the organism in a potential “rudimentary” form and then 
manifest in the actual “current” form.
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The combination of these two provisions results in a contradictory impression. If one 
thinks about the accuracy of such descriptions, one can spot an error of two levels (or 
languages) overlapping. There is a description error, which is that the same descriptive 
language applied to the empirical objects, is also applied to the first-person perspective. 
However, assuming that the first-person perspective is not identical to these objects, the 
use of the language appears arbitrary. As I have suggested, if the first-person perspective 
is an observing condition or an observation point itself (which is how the first-person 
perspective is usually defined — as a viewpoint), then placing it in the observed will lock 
inside of itself a hidden inconsistency. In addition, if we assume that the first-person per-
spective, as in Metzinger’s theory, can appear (in Metzinger’s theory — at one of the levels) 
as a condition of certain states (for example, specific experiences), then placing it in the 
field of action of these experiences themselves is wrong. As I have proposed, if the first-
person perspective is an observing condition or an observation point itself (which is how 
the first-person perspective is usually defined — as a viewpoint), then placing it in the 
observed will hide an inconsistency inside of itself. This inconsistency will represent an 
attempt to apply the attributes and properties that we find in the world as the observed, to 
the condition of observation. In effect, it would mean that the first-person perspective is 
lost or dissolved in the observed, and in our case, therefore, in the empirical or observable. 
The latter, in fact, will result in the reduction of subjectivity. From the above it may be con-
cluded that moderate naturalism is extremely difficult to execute, as it seeks to transform 
into a radical one.
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В статье показано, что некоторые теории, защищающие нередуцируемый характер пер-
спективы от первого лица, далеко не всегда демонстрируют последовательное отноше-
ние к этой перспективе. Подобные теории автор связывает с так называемым умерен-
ным натурализмом. В статье демонстрируется разница между умеренным и радикаль-
ным натурализмом. Радикальный натурализм полностью отказывается от идеи субъ-
ективности как ненаблюдаемой с точки зрения третьего лица. Умеренный натурализм 
же, напротив, защищает несводимость субъективности и считает субъективность ча-
стью природы. В качестве примера умеренного натурализма в статье рассматриваются 
подходы Линн Бейкер и Томаса Метцингера. Используя их подходы к перспективе от 
первого лица в качестве примера, показано, что при определенных стратегиях работы, 
ориентированных на перспективу от первого лица, возможно появление так называ-
емой ошибки описания, под которой понимается ошибка описания субъективности, 
когда она находится в мире, как часть природы, по законам которой она существует. 
Логика этой ошибки рассмотрена на основе утверждения Людвига Витгенштейна о не-
* В данной научной работе использованы результаты проекта «Искусственный интеллект 
и “человек разумный” как объект философско-этического анализа», выполненного в рамках Про-
граммы фундаментальных исследований НИУ ВШЭ в 2021 г.
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правильном расположении глаза в перспективе самого взгляда. Если перспектива от 
первого лица вводится в качестве точки зрения (или точки наблюдения), то ее последу-
ющий сдвиг в область результатов наблюдения приводит к ошибке описания. Если же 
никакого наблюдения нет, как нет и самой точки зрения, то мы лишаемся самой идеи 
перспективы от первого лица и фактически занимаем позицию радикального натура-
лизма. Следовательно, позицию умеренного натурализма крайне сложно реализовать, 
так как она стремится перейти в радикальную форму.
Ключевые слова: перспектива от первого лица, субъективность, Л. Бейкер, Т. Метцин-
гер, Л. Витгенштейн, натурализм, умеренный натурализм, радикальный натурализм.
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